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Preface 
Peacekeeping and stability operations have, since the end of the Cold 
War, experienced significant difficulties with coherence and coordina-
tion, in turn resulting in poor sustainability. A recurrent problem has 
been the absence of a common planning process, in which the actors 
involved formulate the goals of the operation and subsequently follow 
a joint strategy for achieving them.1 
 
Comprehensive Approach (CA) and Whole-of-Government Approach 
(WGA) are rather new concepts within the field of security studies. 
They can be described as approaches based on the assumption that 
greater integration, coherence and coordination will result in more ef-
fective peacekeeping operations.2 The concept of CA has been 
adopted by different international organizations and WGA by several 
countries which in different ways have related to the concept in 
propositions and steering documents. Sweden, Finland, Norway and 
Denmark have also realized the importance of CA/WGA, not least as 
regards the ongoing operation in Afghanistan where all the Nordic 
countries are involved and where the operation is characterized by a 
range of actors working on different missions within the same field. 
What do these Nordic national strategies towards CA/WGA look like? 
Might we speak of a common Nordic CA/WGA model? 
 
On 11 January 2010, the Sociology Group at the Institution for Lead-
ership and Management (ILM) held a seminar at the Swedish National 
Defence College (SNDC) on ‘How to Improve Inter-agency Coopera-
tion in Afghanistan– a Nordic Perspective’. The aim was to describe 
the national CA strategies developed in Sweden, Finland, Norway and 
Denmark and see if and how they had been implemented in the current 
operation in Afghanistan, as well as whether there were any possibili-
ties for a joint Nordic strategy toward CA. 
 
Presenters at the seminar were representatives from four institutions in 
the Nordic countries: Jari Mustonen from Crisis Management Centre 
Finland (CMC Finland), Finn Stepputat from the Danish Institute for 
                                                 
1  Cedric de Coning, ‘The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach’ DIIS Report 
14, 2008. 
2  Sanaa Rehman, ‘Comprehensive Approach: det pragmatiska förhållningssättet till samar-
bete och koordinering vid fredsfrämjande insatser i komplexa konflikter’ in Elma P. 
Göransson, Sanaa Rehman, Aida Alvinius, Björn Tomtlund, Ingemar Robertson, Franz 
Kernic and Gerry Larsson, Comprehensive Approach: litteraturgenomgångar av begrep-
pet och dess relation till ledarskap samt en empirisk intervjustudie, Försvarshögskolan, 
Stockholm: 2010. 
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International Studies (DIIS), Göran Grönberg from the Swedish Na-
tional Defence College (SNDC) and Karsten Friis from the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The organizer of the seminar 
was Sanaa Rehman from SNDC. 
 
This report is a result of the seminar held at SNDC, and the ensuing 
collaboration between SNDC and NUPI. It has one chapter on each 
Nordic country and a summarizing conclusion, all aimed at enhancing 
our understanding of the different Nordic approaches to coherence and 
coordination, and at further elaborating the discussions on joint Nordic 
security cooperation. 
 
Lastly, we would like to thank Susan Høivik for proof-reading and 
Andreas Øien Stensland for his assistance with editing and formatting. 
Their efforts were indispensable for finalizing the volume.  
 
Sanaa Rehman and Karsten Friis 
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Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis  
Management Strategy 
Jari Mustonen 
Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC) 
 
 
 
Recognizing the complexity and nature of modern crises and conflicts, 
the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009 
noted the need for a comprehensive and systematic approach for ac-
tors and states engaged in crisis management, and that Finland should 
strengthen its comprehensive approach to crisis management and post-
conflict reconstruction.3 Furthermore, Finland’s National Strategy for 
Civilian Crisis Management, approved in August 2008, emphasizes 
the importance of a comprehensive approach and of improving coor-
dination among a range of actors, civil–military coordination, utilizing 
the synergies between development cooperation and civilian crisis 
management, and participation of civil society representatives to (ci-
vilian) crisis management.4 One recommendation of the National 
Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management was that the Comprehensive 
Crisis Management Strategy should take into consideration the above-
mentioned priorities. 
 
After preparatory work of slightly more than a year, Finland’s Com-
prehensive Crisis Management Strategy was approved on 13 Novem-
ber 2009.5 The strategy was drafted by a working group composed of 
representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Political De-
partment and Department for Development Policy, the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office, and as well as from the Ministry of the Interior, the Min-
istry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command. 
The strategy aims at strengthening a comprehensive approach in Fin-
nish participation in crisis management activities, particularly in situa-
tions in which Finland engages means of civilian and military crisis 
management in response to international conflicts or post-conflict re-
construction.  
                                                 
3  Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009, Government report, Prime Minister’s Office 
Publications no. 13, 2009. 
4  Finland’s National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management, Ministry of the Interior, 
Approved by the Finnish Government on 28 August 2008.  
5  Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy, unofficial translation, 25 Novem-
ber 2009. 
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This article, based on a presentation given at the Swedish National 
Defence College seminar on 12 January 2010, briefly presents the key 
objectives and principles of Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Man-
agement Strategy, and comments on the scope and priorities set out in 
the strategy.6 
Key objectives 
At the outset, the strategy recognizes the different roles and responsi-
bilities of actors engaged in military and civilian crisis management, 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The overall objective 
is to improve the coherence and effectiveness of international efforts 
to respond to crises and conflicts. To this end, the strategy outlines a 
set of key objectives, as further elaborated in the following. 
Active participation in military crisis management 
The strategy sees military crisis management is a ‘key element’ of 
Finland’s crisis management participation, and aims at advancing in-
ternational peace and security, supporting humanitarian assistance and 
protecting the civilian population. The defence establishment recog-
nizes the heightened requirements for military capabilities, and to this 
end, seeks to maintain and develop ‘high-quality and versatile’ mili-
tary crisis management capabilities. 
 
In practical terms, active participation in military crisis management 
means maintaining Finnish participation at the level when the strategy 
was approved, of some 700 soldiers.7 After downsizing in the KFOR 
mission in Kosovo at the end of 2009 by some 200 soldiers, the cur-
rent size of the Finnish contribution is slightly under 500 troops. 
 
However, Finland will increase its present participation of 140 sol-
diers to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan by approximately 50 sol-
diers – to a maximum of 195. Finland has also begun preparing its 
participation in two separate European Union Battle Groups in 2011: 
the Swedish-led Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) and Dutch-led Nether-
lands Battle Group (NLBG11). The Finnish contribution to the Battle 
Groups amounts roughly to 300 troops that are currently being re-
cruited. Thus the number of Finnish troops in international operations, 
including the Battle Groups, might temporarily reach 800 soldiers dur-
ing 2010. Future participation in military crisis management beyond 
                                                 
6  The comments and remarks made in this article are solely those of the writer and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Crisis Management Centre Finland. 
7  Finnish legislation allows deploying a maximum of 2,000 soldiers in international mis-
sions; however, in practice the limit has been set to 1,000 troops. As peacekeeping opera-
tions have become more challenging and expensive also in terms of material and logistic 
requirements, the number of troops has become further reduced. 
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2010, however, will decrease significantly, with the further downsiz-
ing of KFOR in Kosovo and the withdrawal of MINURCAT from 
Chad in 2010. 
 
For Finnish military crisis management, the strategy highlights the 
European Union and NATO as key actors. Finland also continues to 
participate in UN-led peacekeeping operations, even though at the 
moment that would appear to be less of a priority. Following the with-
drawal from Chad, Finland has been participating in UN peacekeeping 
operations with only some 20 military observers and a few staff offi-
cers. 
Strengthened participation in civilian crisis management 
As outlined in the National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management, 
Finland has strengthened its participation in civilian crisis manage-
ment and peacebuilding, and the number of Finnish civilian experts 
has increased from around 100 in 2008 to some 160 as of the begin-
ning of 2010. Most of these experts (approximately 100 of them) are 
deployed to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mis-
sions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Georgia, with a smaller number 
employed by the OSCE – mainly in the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia, and the UN field missions in Africa. 
 
Despite the rapid development of civilian crisis management, there is 
still a need for further increasing Finland’s contribution to civilian cri-
sis management and peacebuilding operations. In April 2009, Finland 
approved a policy directive on Afghanistan. The directive presents the 
pertinent challenges in Afghanistan, together with means of respond-
ing to those, including development aid, NGOs, humanitarian aid, ci-
vilian crisis management and military crisis management. As outlined 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in January 2010, Afghanistan is a 
priority for Finland’s participation in crisis management. Hence, the 
Finnish contribution to EUPOL Afghanistan should be increased to 
over 30 experts. Also the Finnish contribution to UN missions, espe-
cially in Africa, should be strengthened. It is envisioned that Finland 
will deploy up to 200 civilian experts in the future – a goal that poses 
additional challenges to Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland, 
which recruits, trains and deploys Finnish civilian experts.8 
                                                 
8  CMC Finland, founded in 2007, is a governmental organization under the Ministry of the 
Interior. The main tasks of CMC Finland include recruiting, training and deploying Fin-
nish civilian experts to civilian crisis management and peacebuilding operations, logistical 
and material preparedness, research and development, and international humanitarian re-
sponse and civil protection tasks, including Finn Rescue Finland (FRF). 
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Broad civil–military coordination and cooperation 
The strategy recognizes that while the means and responsibilities of 
actors involved in development cooperation and crisis management 
are different, they can be mutually complementary. Particular atten-
tion should be paid to synergies between civilian crisis management 
and development cooperation – a link that often is critical in building 
sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict. Furthermore, 
the coordination between military and civilian crisis management 
must be intensified, as the actors often share a common area of opera-
tions, and may even have tasks that are interlinked or overlapping. 
First and foremost, this cooperation and coordination should be inten-
sified at the national level between administrative branches, to im-
prove Finland’s capacity to contribute to international efforts at con-
flict prevention and resolution. 
Support to security sector reform and rule of law development 
The importance of security sector reform as part of various peace-
building processes is emphasized in the strategy, with a view to par-
ticipation in such operations, as well as support to security sector re-
form by providing sufficient financial resources. In particular, Finland 
aims at improving its capacity to participate in training and mentoring 
tasks in the security sector. 
Promoting dialogue with civil society and NGOs 
The strategy highlights the role and expertise of national and interna-
tional NGOs and civil society in promoting a comprehensive ap-
proach. Civil society actors are often on the ground throughout the 
conflict cycle and possess invaluable skills that can be better utilized, 
both in contributing to external conflict management efforts, and even 
more importantly, in directly supporting the countries emerging from 
conflict. 
Greater emphasis on human rights and equality  
In September 2009, the Finnish Government adopted a report on the 
country’s human rights policy, outlining Finland’s aim of advancing 
the rights of women, children, persons with disabilities, minorities and 
indigenous people. 
Strengthening the EU contribution to international crisis man-
agement  
Finland participates actively in European Union crisis management 
operations, both civilian and military, and considers it important that 
EU capacity to respond to growing challenges in crisis management is 
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strengthened. Improving the linkage between elements of CSDP and 
EU Development Policy is of utmost importance for greater EU com-
prehensiveness – to which it is hoped that the Lisbon Treaty may con-
tribute. 
Promoting cooperation among international crisis management 
actors 
Perhaps the most ambitious of the objectives in the strategy, and 
something to which Finland has only limited means to contribute, is 
the promotion of mutual cooperation and coordination between inter-
national actors. It is essential to define clear common objectives in 
response to each crisis – which has been painfully difficult to achieve 
thus far. For this reason, practical cooperation on the ground between 
the actors must be promoted. 
Key measures 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the strategy formulates cer-
tain measures – mostly national and rather concrete. With a view to 
strengthening the EU as a major international crisis management ac-
tor, Finland seeks to actively promote a comprehensive approach in 
the EU, including not just the CSDP actors but the Commission and 
EU’s Special Representatives as well. However, the strategy fails to 
specify what the concrete measures are, and how Finland actually 
aims to further EU comprehensiveness. 
 
In order to improve the comprehensive approach at the national level, 
the strategy proposes the establishment of a Strategic Coordination 
Group under the lead of the MFA. The group would consist of repre-
sentatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of Defence, the Defence Command, the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice and the Ministry of Finance, and would be tasked with monitoring 
and promoting the comprehensive development of crisis management. 
 
On the practical or desk level, the strategy recommends assembling 
inter-ministerial task forces that can convene when needed and focus 
on specific crisis areas. Experiences from such inter-ministerial 
groups on Kosovo and Afghanistan have been promising. With respect 
to Afghanistan, the practical work involved, inter alia, providing ad-
vice to Finnish-funded projects that the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRT) implemented in their area. With respect to the PRTs and 
their comprehensive approach, however, it must be said that Finnish 
experiences of combining civilian expertise in the form of police, po-
litical and development advisers to – and under – a military structure 
seem rather contradictory. Even though the work of the civilian ex-
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perts would provide added value to the work of the PRTs, working 
under military command appears to have been challenging. The par-
ticipation of Finnish civilian experts to the PRTs was terminated by 
the end of 2009. 
 
A more operational and practical measure involves strengthening the 
comprehensive approach in the development of national crisis man-
agement capacities. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for de-
veloping national capacities for civilian crisis management, whereas 
the defence establishment is in charge of developing military crisis 
management capacities. While there have been some attempts at col-
laboration and information exchange in the field of material prepared-
ness and development, training of personnel to be deployed to interna-
tional missions remains a key area for furthering the idea of a compre-
hensive approach. 
 
A practical solution to enhance interaction and coordination among 
the actors operating in crisis areas – not related to the strategy, how-
ever – was the establishment of the Finnish Centre of Expertise in 
Comprehensive Crisis Management by CMC Finland and the Finnish 
Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT). The Centre of Ex-
pertise annually organizes a joint course ‘Integrated Crisis Manage-
ment’ which gathers participants from the military, civilian police, ci-
vilian crisis management experts, development cooperation experts 
and humanitarian aid workers. The aim of the course is to further the 
idea of a comprehensive approach by familiarizing the participants 
with the structures and operating procedures of the other actors, and 
by offering participants the opportunity to jointly consider possibilities 
for acting more comprehensively in response to various conflicts and 
crises. 
 
Human resources are another critical aspect relating to the develop-
ment of national capacities – securing adequate number of competent 
civilian and military personnel to be deployed to international mis-
sions. The legislation and legal provisions relating to service abroad 
(such as securing the leave of absence without losing employment) are 
generally in place. Nevertheless, recruitment to demanding operations 
like Afghanistan, Sudan or Chad has been challenging. One measure 
that has been taken for civilian experts and military personnel in Af-
ghanistan has been to improve the terms of employment as regards 
salary and per diem allowances. 
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Some comments  
Finally, some comments on the strategy as a whole, and on the priori-
ties and measures involved. First of all, the effort to formulate a strat-
egy focused on improving comprehensiveness in crisis management 
and peacebuilding must be commended, and the strategy describes the 
present Finnish participation in crisis management well. It should also 
be noted that the strategy was prepared as a joint effort involving sev-
eral ministries and administrative branches – indicating the quality of 
cooperation between the national authorities. However, there are few 
considerations that I feel undermine the comprehensive nature of the 
strategy paper. 
 
In the preparation of the strategy, the working group was composed 
solely of governmental representatives, with no representatives from 
NGOs or civil society. The draft document was circulated among civil 
society and NGO representatives for comment – but still, the lack of 
direct participation in the process evidently undermined their input to 
the paper. The question remains: whose comprehensiveness are we 
actually talking about? The same criticism applies to the Strategic Co-
ordination Group or the inter-ministerial task forces, as it seems that 
the focus on the strategy is very much on coordination among the 
various administrative branches (resembling the Whole-of-
Government Approach, WGA) rather than reaching out to a compre-
hensive range of actors, even domestically. Implementation of the 
strategy has, as of spring 2010, already started with the conveying of 
the Strategic Coordination Group – and civil society representatives 
have expressed interest in participating in the Group, as well as in the 
inter-ministerial task forces.9 
 
Another point concerns the scope of the strategy. The lengthy and 
somewhat fragmented document focuses on Finland’s current partici-
pation in crisis management and development cooperation, describing 
the various challenges faced and some efforts to counter them. The 
paper indicates priority areas for Finnish participation in crisis man-
agement and peacebuilding activities, but on many points it fails to 
specify concrete ways of implementing these objectives. Again we 
must ask: What actually is the Finnish comprehensive strategy? 
 
As to the priorities of the document, the strategy is rather military-
oriented and biased towards military participation in crisis manage-
ment, thus narrowing the concept comprehensiveness. The paper notes 
that ‘military crisis management continues to be a key element of 
Finland’s crisis management participation’ – but how can the strategy 
be ‘comprehensive’ if military participation is the starting point for 
                                                 
9  This idea has been put forward especially by the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Net-
work (KATU).  
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such comprehensiveness? It cannot be denied that in many operations 
the military are the key actor with a crucial role to play, especially in 
securing the cessation of hostilities and protection of civilians, but the 
military should be a part of a wider, truly comprehensive solution to a 
crisis or conflict. As the cases of, for example, Afghanistan or Iraq 
have shown, military engagement alone is not enough to build sus-
tainable peace. 
 
The strategy puts the UN slightly aside as an actor, whereas NATO 
and the EU are highlighted. However, it should not be forgotten the 
UN possesses great amount of relevant experience and practical 
knowledge from its Integrated Missions that have genuinely combined 
many actors under a single command and guidance. These experiences 
have not been one-sidedly positive, but they might provide valuable 
lessons for the EU and NATO in developing their strategies and capa-
bilities. Following the Lisbon Treaty, and in the course of creating the 
new European External Action Service, the EU comprehensiveness 
has assumed rather odd forms – as in the new Crisis Management 
Planning Directorate, where key posts are manned by military person-
nel, even though 11 out of 13 ongoing CSDP operations are civilian. 
 
The strategy does emphasize training and research in furthering com-
prehensiveness among the various actors, and indicates certain means 
to respond to the challenges. Still, it remains vague as to concrete 
steps, for instance regarding the development of a comprehensive ca-
pacity/capability. 
 
Overall, Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy at-
tempts to outline principles and some measures for developing com-
prehensiveness in crisis management activities, and can be com-
mended for summarizing the various aspects relating to Finnish par-
ticipation in international crisis management and peacebuilding opera-
tions. Unfortunately, the strategy fails to rise to a new, innovative 
level in furthering truly comprehensive thinking in its approach to cri-
sis management and peacebuilding. Rather, it echoes the traditional 
security-based thinking. More emphasis is needed on promoting the 
principles of human security as the ultimate objective of a comprehen-
sive approach, as these principles should constitute the core of any 
strategy seeking to achieve comprehensiveness. 
Inter-agency Cooperation:  
A Danish Perspective 
Finn Stepputat 
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) 
 
 
 
The Danish government has deployed troops to Afghanistan since the 
2001 invasion, and opened a diplomatic representation as well as a 
series of development and humanitarian assistance programmes in 
2002. As of 2010, some 700 Danish troops are deployed in Afghani-
stan, mainly in the unruly Helmand province in the south of the coun-
try, where they have been engaged in combat operations since 2006. 
 
This chapter analyses inter-agency cooperation as it has developed 
during the Danish engagement in Afghanistan, first under the concept 
of concerted planning and action (CPA) from 2004 to 2009, and, since 
2010, under a more comprehensive organizational set-up, developed 
mainly under the influence of the specific demands and experience of 
the operation in Afghanistan. The analysis is based to a considerable 
extent on the analysis of the concerted civil–military planning and ac-
tion undertaken by the Danish Institute for International Studies in 
2008–2009.10 
Concerted Planning and Action, 2004--2009 
In late 2003 the question of an integrated approach emerged on the 
national agenda. It did so, not as a response to the situation in Af-
ghanistan but rather because of the complex situation that had devel-
oped in Iraq after the invasion in 2003, where the Danish government 
had deployed troops as part of the Coalition of the Willing. The minis-
tries for Defence and Foreign Affairs (MoD, MFA) already had some 
experience from civil–military coordination in Kosovo, where NATO 
forces and humanitarian organizations became better acquainted with 
each other.  
 
However, these experiences proved to be of little use in Iraq, where 
the intense resistance and Iraqi in-fighting made it impossible for ci-
                                                 
10  See www.diis.dk/sw72612.asp 
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vilian agencies to work.11 Therefore the two ministries involved de-
veloped the concept of Concerted (civil–military) Planning and Action 
(CPA), which was inscribed in the defence agreement 2004–2009. 
This agreement abolished Denmark’s territorial defence and focused 
on involvement in international ‘peace support operations’. 
 
The Concerted Planning and Action concept involved: 1) a simple 
structure for coordination of military and reconstruction tasks at the 
strategic (inter-agency civil servant committee in Copenhagen) and 
tactical levels (steering unit); 2) a set of guidelines and a training 
course that prepared the armed forces to facilitate small-scale recon-
struction activities in the absence of civilian agencies; 3) a small fund 
(2 mill. Euros from the humanitarian aid budget) for such activities; 
and 4) a Humanitarian Contact Group between the MoD, MFA, and 
key humanitarian organizations in Denmark.12 The Danish govern-
ment also pressed for the development of CPA in the context of 
NATO and other international organizations, where the concept of the 
Comprehensive Approach would take over from 2006 onwards. 
Operational experience 
Operationalization of the CPA was characterized by ad hoc and ex-
perimental arrangements as it was adapted to the evolving contexts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. As the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams developed in both countries, the Danish steering unit gradually 
became obsolete. In Afghanistan, the Danish contribution was inte-
grated in first the German PRT in Faizabad, and later in the UK PRT 
in Helmand. In neither case have the Danish Armed forces had ‘their 
own’ Area of Operation, although the main focus of Danish personnel 
has been the town of Gereshk.  
 
Since the involvement in the South, the demands for cooperation with 
UK civilian and military agencies at the strategic and tactical levels 
have been high, and relations to ‘big brother’ in London have to some 
degree overshadowed Danish inter-agency cooperation. For example, 
the finalization of strategies has had to await the outcome of complex 
negotiations among the UK ministries involved (DfID, MoD and 
MFA). The operational integration of Danish contributions in Hel-
mand would appear to be functioning rather well, while the major dis-
                                                 
11  See Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Civil–Military Relations in Iraq 2003–7: the Danish Experience’ 
DIIS Report 13, 2009. 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009_13_Civil-
Military_Relations_Iraq_web.pdf 
12  See Finn Stepputat, ‘Integrated National Approaches to International Operations’ DIIS 
Report 14, 2009 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009_14_Integrated
_National_Approaches_International_Operations_web.pdf   
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tances in institutional terms are those between the field offices and the 
national capitals in the UK and Denmark. 
 
According to a 2008 analysis by Søren Schmidt,13 relations between 
the Danish civilian and military entities were, as in most other coun-
tries involved in the operation, characterized by different time hori-
zons, as well as expectations as to available civilian resources and 
reach-back capacity. Seen from the military perspective, the follow-up 
to operations of ‘clear and hold’ in terms of civilian capacities for the 
‘build’ phase was too slow, too weak, and with too little operational 
back-up from – or influence on – the embassy and Copenhagen. The 
military personnel also lamented the limited presence of the Afghan 
administration at district level and the lack of resources forthcoming 
from the government in Kabul. 
 
On their part, the military personnel showed little understanding of the 
reluctance of the Danish MFA towards channelling Danish develop-
ment aid directly to Helmand rather than through national Afghan in-
stitutions and multi-donor trust funds, as stipulated in best practices 
for development cooperation. In addition, the Danish MFA had issues 
with the reluctant military support and protection of civilian advisors. 
While this was seriously affecting the operation of the advisors, the 
military were displeased with the strains that close protection put on 
their resources for kinetic operations. The obvious compromise – the 
use of private security companies – was considered a political no-go 
area in Copenhagen. But in practical terms the problem was solved by 
resorting to the services of a private company, Armour Group, work-
ing on contract with the UK government. 
Strategic issues 
Within the institutions involved in the counterinsurgency programmes 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and not least in the wider Danish public, the 
Concerted Planning and Action has been perceived as related to the 
tactical-level issues of army-facilitated reconstruction activities, such 
as construction of schools and wells. The 2008–2012 strategy for Af-
ghanistan has general and more specific objectives for the various 
civil and military elements of Denmark’s contribution. While still 
somewhat lofty, this strategy is more concrete and realistic than previ-
ous versions. In addition, the ministries developed annual strategies 
for Helmand in 2008 and 2009. Schmidt (2009) argues that these 
                                                 
13  Søren Schmidt, ‘Afghanistan: Organizing Danish Civil–Military Relations’ DIIS Report 
16, 2009 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009_15_Afghanista
n_web.pdf; and Finn Stepputat, ‘Synthesis Report: Civil–Military Relations in Interna-
tional Operations’ DIIS Report 14, 2009. 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009_16_Synthesis_
Report_web.pdf 
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strategies lack the perspective of political stabilization, for example in 
the development of the education sector in Helmand. 
 
Since 2007/2008, it has become increasingly clear that inter-agency 
cooperation must take place at more strategic levels – not only in the 
form of Whole-of-Government approaches, but, more importantly, 
between NATO, UN, the EU, the US and other donor countries as 
well as the host government. 
 
Whereas Denmark has only limited influence on these efforts, various 
issues of inter-agency cooperation have emerged at the national level. 
The inter-agency civil servant group served well for initial discussions 
and information between the involved institutions, but was not func-
tional in terms of strategic planning and operation. This was taken 
over by the Afghan Task Force with a networking inter-agency team 
placed in the MFA. However, while the task force formulated inte-
grated Danish plans for the Helmand operation, the development 
component looked more like ‘development as usual’, with little con-
sideration of the specific problems in an area characterized by mini-
mal and strongly contested state presence and the absence of legiti-
mate institutions for mediating political conflicts. 
 
Thus, given the specifics of a province like Helmand, the crucial void 
in inter-agency cooperation for strategic planning and operation has 
been the lack of political guidance and leadership within an overall 
strategy of political stabilization. State-building is not likely to take 
place until some kind of political stabilization has been achieved, 
which is a central point in the current British version of counterinsur-
gency.  
 
Related to this issue, an Achilles’ heel of strategic development has 
been the lack of local expertise in monitoring and evaluation, includ-
ing systematic analyses14 of how the security and development com-
ponents interact and enhance or hinder the overall objectives. Thus, 
for example, education and school-building programmes cannot be 
carried out as if the situation were normal and without acknowledging 
that education is a deeply politicized and conflictual issue in a conser-
vative region. 
Towards a more comprehensive approach: 2010--2014 
The new defence agreement 2010–14 became an occasion for the 
Danish government to re-conceptualize and develop its inter-agency 
cooperation. Thus, as of 2010, a new organizational set-up has been 
                                                 
14  Such as Peace and Conflict Impact Analysis (PCIA), path analysis, and political economy 
analysis. 
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established with the aim of strengthening the Whole-of-Government 
approach to stabilization, reconstruction and capacity-building in areas 
of conflict. 
 
A centrepiece of the new structure is a global framework fund of 20 
mill. Euros per year. These funds are taken from the budgets of de-
fence, development cooperation, and foreign affairs. Although they 
remain under the responsibility of each of these ministers, the dis-
bursements are not restricted by the OECD/DAC criteria for develop-
ment aid which have tended to strain inter-agency cooperation. It may 
also be argued that reconstruction activities in conflict areas can often 
not be carried out in accordance with best practices valid for devel-
opment cooperation activities. 
 
Whereas the Afghanistan Task Force continues in function, the gov-
ernment has set up a new administrative structure for Danish engage-
ment in/with areas in conflict and fragile situations. At the executive 
level, the ministers of development, defence, and foreign affairs (plus 
others on an ad hoc basis) meet annually to determine political, the-
matic and geographic priorities, including for the Afghanistan opera-
tion. 
 
At the next level, an inter-agency steering group puts forth pro-
grammes and components for the global framework fund. Meeting at 
least four times a year, the group brings together high-level represen-
tatives from the ministries of state, defence, foreign affairs,15 and jus-
tice plus, on an ad hoc basis, the defence command, the police, the 
ministry of integration or/or other relevant instances. Decisions are to 
be consensus-based, and the individual ministries will remain respon-
sible for implementing the various components of the overall pro-
gramme. The chairmanship rotates between the MoD and MFA. 
 
An inter-agency secretariat with four to six employees supports the 
steering group and carries out the day-to-day administration. The se-
cretariat is placed under the MFA, but the employees continue to have 
functions in their mother departments (MoD and MFA). They deal 
with relations to the various thematic and geographic sections in the 
ministries, the armed forces, diplomatic representations, civilian advi-
sors, private companies, NGOs, etc. Furthermore, they manage fact-
finding missions and facilitate the development of a new resource base 
for recruiting civilian advisors, as well as related processes of report-
ing, evaluation and learning. Previously, monitoring and reporting had 
been fragmented between many entities and stored in various incom-
patible archives. 
                                                 
15  In Denmark, the Minister of Development Cooperation is responsible for this budget, but 
the administration is integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Finally a broad reference group with representatives from relevant 
state entities, the judiciary, NGOs, private companies, etc. meets occa-
sionally to discuss and exchange experiences from involvement in ar-
eas of conflict and fragile situations.  
 
Regarding the relations between Copenhagen and the tactical level 
where troops have been deployed in Afghanistan, separate lines of 
command are maintained between civilian and military entities. 
Unlike the situation in more stable areas of Afghanistan, civilian state 
entities have to work closely with the military in places like Helmand. 
Hence, in the current UK PRT structure, working under civilian ‘di-
rection’ (without command and control over military units), opera-
tional planning is carried out in a joint leadership group before being 
implemented by the individual civilian and military entities. 
 
In the complex, multinational set-up of the PRT, the presence of an 
experienced, high-level representative of the Danish MFA is crucial 
for coordination between the participating national and civil/military 
entities, as well as for relations back to Copenhagen. Whereas this 
kind of expertise is rare, it seems essential for inter-agency coopera-
tion to be able to have available persons versed in civilian as well as 
military structures, and with experience from headquarters as well as 
field offices in conflict areas. Whether the new system will be capable 
of producing this kind of expertise is another question. Hitherto, the 
career system in the MFA has not encouraged specialized career 
paths, and field postings in hardship areas have not been sufficiently 
valued as an asset for promotion. 
 
As the new governmental set-up has been in place only since spring 
2010, it is still too early to say whether it will work and what kinds of 
problems may arise. But it seems that, to the extent that the govern-
ment chooses to deploy Danish troops in high-intensity conflict, the 
direction taken with the new set-up is unavoidable.  
 
On the other hand, the Afghanistan experience should not become the 
sole model for Danish civil–military engagement abroad. NATO’s 
comprehensive approach16 (and the gigantic US engagement) defines 
a heavily nationalized model which pushes for WGA set-ups. The UN, 
with all its current deficiencies and lack of robustness, has developed 
a different model for an integrated approach that comprises civilian 
and military instruments within the same political organization.17
                                                 
16  See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Opera-
tions: A work in slow progress’ DIIS Report 15. 2008 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report_2008-
15_NATO_Comprehensive_Approach_Crisis_Response_Operations.pdf  
17  See Cedric de Coning, ‘United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach’ DIIS report 
14, 2008 http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report-2008-
14_The_United_Nations_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf 
A Swedish Approach to  
Comprehensiveness 
Göran Grönberg 
Swedish National Defence College 
 
 
 
Sweden has a long tradition of close and extensive civil–military co-
operation, developed during the Cold War period. The Swedish Total 
Defence Concept had a very specific aim: to bring together all state-
controlled institutions and even some private enterprises in order to 
prevent, and if necessary halt, a military invasion from the Soviet Un-
ion. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of the 
Cold War, the Total Defence Concept gradually ceased to exist. 
 
Today, in the twenty-first century, many in the international commu-
nity are looking for better solutions to counter crises in conflict areas 
by combining, or better coordinating, civil and military instruments 
and capabilities. The term ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is often used, 
without being clearly defined. 
 
From experienced peacekeepers to official administration bureaucrats 
it is often claimed that the culture of coordination now sought by the 
international community is really nothing new. With its long tradition 
in civil–military relations, Sweden could contribute considerable ex-
perience to the international community. Such views are especially 
common among Swedish officers who experienced the Cold War in 
the northernmost parts of Europe. 
 
This chapter assesses such statements by examining the prerequisites 
for successful Swedish civil–military cooperation against current de-
mands for solving complex crisis situations. It presents two govern-
ment documents setting out policy and practice: the Swedish national 
strategy including civil–military engagement in international crisis 
management,18 and the Swedish Afghanistan Strategy19 outlining pol-
icy implementation in practice. 
                                                 
18  Government Communication 2007/08:51, National strategy for Swedish participation in 
international peace-support and security-building operations, Stockholm: 13 March 
2008. 
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Non-defined ‘comprehensiveness’ vs. the Swedish Total De-
fence Concept 
The first challenge comes with the non-defined term ‘comprehensive 
approach’. In this chapter it will be understood as referring to a culture 
of cooperation and desire to enhance the effectiveness of engagement 
in complex crisis resolution, to be achieved by combining the use of 
military and non-military capabilities to the greatest possible extent. 
Within a government administration this requires a top–down (Whole-
of-Government) approach. However, in a crisis area there must also be 
a bottom–up approach, whereby also non-governmental actors con-
tribute to the enhanced effectiveness on a voluntary basis – together 
with government and state actors. 
 
In Sweden during the Cold War, all non-military actors contributed to 
the fulfilment of the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed 
Forces mission in order to keep out an aggressor. This was a military-
centred approach with a single and clear end-state, on Swedish soil, 
governed by national legislation.  
 
Comparing the Swedish Total Defence Concept with the understand-
ing of a comprehensive approach as used here, we may note consis-
tencies as well as inconsistencies. While the top–down approach is 
evident in both cases, there are differences. In the Swedish context, 
national legislation demanded cooperation and coordination between 
and among the actors. In the international context, this can occur only 
once an agreement has been reached – and the various non-
governmental actors will normally not be covered by such an agree-
ment. The top–down approach in the Swedish context was possible 
since the cooperation and activities took place where Swedish legisla-
tion had primacy. 
 
Such military-centred approaches to defending Sweden apply only in 
interstate confrontations where national sovereignty and independence 
are at stake. In intrastate conflict, or in failing states, no military solu-
tion alone can turn crisis into peace. Military force can act only as part 
of the solution, in a support function to non-military actors. 
 
Today’s Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB: in Swedish, 
Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap) is tasked with en-
hancing and supporting societal capacities in their preparedness for, 
and prevention of, emergencies and crisis. Structures for civil emer-
gency planning are coordinated by the MSB, which holds the mandate 
for a holistic and all-hazard approach to emergency management. The 
                                                 
19  Utrikesdepartementet UF2009/46364/ASO, Sveriges strategi för utvecklingssamarbetet 
med Afghanistan för perioden den 1 juli – den 31 december 2013. Stockholm: 9 July 
2009. 
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agency also employs personnel in international operations in support 
of other organizations, during and after natural disasters and conflict 
situations.20 
 
The actors working on the national level today have a totally different 
approach than was the case within the Total Defence Concept. The 
MSB, under the direction of the Ministry of Defence, coordinates non-
military actors working in emergencies or crises in Sweden as well as 
abroad. As long as there are no military threats to the country, Swed-
ish Armed Forces on Swedish soil are mostly limited to a supporting 
function. 
 
In sum, Sweden’s previous Swedish Total Defence Concept has very 
little – if any – similarity with today’s comprehensive approach to 
civil–military cooperation in international crisis resolution. It is im-
possible to compare the application of the two concepts, as they are 
based on totally different conditions. 
The Swedish national strategy 
In March 2008, the Swedish government presented the Parliament 
with a national strategy for Swedish participation in international 
peace-support and security-building operations. The purpose of the 
strategy is to provide a complete picture of the level of Swedish aspi-
ration. It links foreign policy, development, security and defence pol-
icy closely together and provides general guidance for Swedish action 
and use of resources. It emphasizes Swedish support for combined 
civil and military action. 
 
Several guidelines in the strategy are of special importance to the de-
velopment of a holistic and comprehensive approach. First, Swedish 
engagement is formulated as an integral and collective part of the pol-
icy towards the country or region concerned. This implies communi-
cation with the affected state to meet its needs and wishes, as well as 
communication with the engaged international community to coordi-
nate and prevent conflict among the various contributors. Second, 
while the engagement is formulated as support to UN and EU peace 
efforts, it will also be covered by an overarching national objective.21 
This implies a formulated objective covering all contributions under 
Swedish government control. 
 
In essence, the national strategy recognizes that security and develop-
ment must go hand in hand, and that effective contributions must in-
clude civil as well as military capabilities. These capabilities will be 
                                                 
20  www.msb.se, 24 March 2010. 
21  Government Communication 2007/08:51 (see fn. 18 above) 
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coordinated through a national objective, although the military contri-
bution will normally be under international command. 
A strategy under implementation 
In July 2009, the Swedish Government decided on a strategy for de-
velopment cooperation with Afghanistan covering 3.5 years of en-
gagement. The strategy – which has been communicated to the Af-
ghan government – sets a clear ambition for the contribution: the 
overall goal of Swedish development cooperation with Afghanistan is 
that people living in poverty, especially women and girls, should en-
joy improved living conditions in a peaceful and democratic society.22 
Furthermore it outlines a range of process goals: improved donor co-
ordination, better monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy, and enhanced Afghan ownership and capacity. It also de-
fines objectives concerning democratic governance and human rights, 
education, private-sector development and humanitarian aid. Finally, 
allocated resources are presented in terms of activities: political dia-
logue through the new embassy in Kabul, 420 million SEK for devel-
opment through NGOs,23 contribution to security providers24 and se-
curity sector reform.25 
 
It is too early to draw any conclusions with regard to the tangible out-
come of this Afghanistan strategy. However, some initial considera-
tions are worth noting. First, the Swedish government has declared its 
willingness to apply a Whole-of-Government approach when it en-
gages in international crisis management. Functional structures have 
been arranged within and between ministries and together with gov-
ernment agencies to enhance coordination. Second, the overarching 
goal of interconnecting various different engagements in Afghanistan 
is a prerequisite for effective coordination, both on the national level 
and with the recipient government. Domestically, this also helps to 
provide legitimacy to the Swedish engagement. Third, there is an on-
going dialogue between generals and directors-general, and their re-
spective staffs have now established working relations. Fourth, the 
Afghanistan strategy has so far had limited impact on the Swedish-led 
work of the Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e Sharif 
in northern Afghanistan – mainly because the military contribution is 
barely mentioned in the strategy. Indeed, there might be good reasons 
for making it vague. Aims and ambitions are agreed within a NATO 
context, without non-NATO members (like Sweden) participating in 
the decision-making process; and agreements and plans are described 
                                                 
22  Utrikesdepartementet UF2009/46364/ASO (see fn 19 above), p. 2. 
23  Swedish Afghanistan Committee, Swedish Red Cross, Save the Children. 
24  nternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF), European Union Police Force (EUPOL). 
25  Utrikesdepartementet UF2009/46364/ASO (see fn 19above). 
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in classified documents. By contrast, Sweden’s military engagement 
in Afghanistan – including its tasks and responsibilities – is approved 
by the Swedish Parliament, on the basis of official documents. 
Conclusions 
This contribution has analysed the foundations for the often-voiced 
view that the Swedish Total Defence Concept established under the 
Cold War period had an approach to civil–military cooperation similar 
to today’s ‘comprehensive approach’ in international crisis resolution. 
The conclusion is that a comprehensive approach has only limited 
similarities with the Sweden’s Cold War Total Defence Concept. 
 
A comprehensive approach in a crisis area requires a similar approach 
within the contributing countries. This ‘Whole-of-Government’ ap-
proach calls for a top–down model within organizations, governments 
and government agencies. With its national strategy for participation 
in international peace support, the Swedish government has laid the 
foundations for such an approach. 
 
Sweden’s overarching objective in Afghanistan – to help turn the dif-
ficult situation in the country into societal prosperity – is clearly set 
out in the Swedish development strategy agreed with the Afghan au-
thorities. Although there is no obvious contradiction between the 
Swedish national objective and the objective agreed within interna-
tional amalgamations, vagueness might obstruct the success of a com-
prehensive approach. 
 
The limited role of the military contribution presented in Sweden’s 
Afghanistan Strategy indicates a restrained ambition of combined civil 
and military action. One reason might be that the PRT is operating 
under NATO command, fulfilling tasks in accordance with an agreed 
operational plan, and not acting under a twin command that would in-
volve receiving operational directives from Stockholm. 
Norwegian Whole-of-Government -- 
Politics in Denial 
Karsten Friis 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
 
 
 
The point of departure of this chapter is that Norway has a long tradi-
tion of aid coordination and a relatively well-coordinated Afghanistan 
policy at the highest political levels.26 Despite this, the delivery in Af-
ghanistan through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) has been 
poorly coordinated. I argue that this is not merely a result of weak or-
ganization or structures. Rather, it is based on, firstly, a deeper con-
flict between key actors regarding the very purpose of Norway’s pres-
ence in Afghanistan – primarily state-building combined with a strug-
gle against the insurgents, or primarily poverty reduction. Secondly, it 
relates to the limited tradition in Norway, in the military and civilian 
agencies alike, of calculating the political effects of operations and 
programmes. The government appears to avoid making a firm deci-
sion on the priorities, and has attempted to continue denying the po-
litical role that it plays. The result is limited coherence and less effi-
cient use of the taxpayers’ money. 
Norwegian aid and foreign policy traditions 
The Norwegian government has a long tradition of utilizing civil soci-
ety in providing aid and support to development overseas – both in 
crises and in regular development aid. UN agencies and Norwegian 
NGOs have often been the implementers of Norwegian aid and devel-
opment programmes throughout the world. Norway may stand as an 
‘aid superpower’: it has more than tripled its development budget 
since 1990. On the other hand, this aid has long been considered a-
political, founded on altruistic principles, universal values and local 
                                                 
26  This article is based largely on Cedric de Coning, Helge Lurås, Niels Nagelhus Schia and 
Ståle Ulriksen, Norway’s Whole-of-Government Approach and its Engagement with Af-
ghanistan, Security in Practice 8, Oslo: NUPI, 2009, hereinafter called Norway’s Whole-
of-Government. The arguments regarding the deeper conflicts about the purpose of being 
in Afghanistan are my own, based on the article The Politics of the Comprehensive Ap-
proach: The Military, Humanitarian and State-building Discourses in Afghanistan, NUPI 
Working Paper 773, Oslo: NUPI, 2010. My thanks to Ståle Ulriksen and Helge Lurås for 
comments on the draft text. 
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needs only.27 Norway has usually been reluctant to change these vast 
resources into conditionality and political demands of the recipients.28 
 
Similarly, Norway has nurtured a self-image as a ‘peace nation’, a 
small state without strategic global interests which can mediate and 
gain trust from both parties in conflicts, while also utilizing its good 
relations with the strong players if necessary. Presenting Norway in 
such a way has even been part of strategic considerations.29 However, 
deployment in Afghanistan came as something new and challenging to 
this altruistic peace identity, adding the security dimension to the clus-
ter. Military and civilian actors were now to work side by side in the 
PRTs,30 and that complicated the previously harmonious relationship 
between the government and civil society actors. In Afghanistan, 
Norway suddenly became a far more political actor, with the military 
helping the Kabul government to expand its control over the entire 
territory and help fight the insurgents. This was to prove hard to com-
bine with the identity as a non-political, altruistic peace-loving nation. 
Norway in Afghanistan 
The Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan is coordinated politically 
by the ‘Afghanistan Forum’, consisting of the state secretaries (deputy 
ministers) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of Justice (equivalent to a ministry of the interior), as well as 
the Office of the Prime Minister. They prepare the government deci-
sions related to all Afghanistan policy, and supply the government 
with coherent input and advice on priorities. They also travel jointly to 
Afghanistan. This political structure is mirrored at the higher level of 
the civil service, where the chief officials coordinate policy implemen-
tation. The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul is also partly linked in with 
this structure.31 The purpose is thus by and large to streamline Nor-
                                                 
27  In e.g. the 2004 Government Report/White Paper to the Parliament, ‘Stortingsmelding 35, 
2003–4, Felles kamp mot fattigdom. En helhetlig utviklingspolitikk’ development assis-
tance is based largely on universal values, human rights etc. The objectives are poverty 
reduction and achieving the Millennium Goals – but this also entails relatively politically 
laden principles like ‘good governance’ and democracy. 
28  See e.g. Terje Tvedt, ‘International development aid and its impact on a donor country: a 
case study of Norway’ European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2007, 
pp. 614–635; Scandinavian readers may also consult Terje Tvedt, Utviklingshjelp, uten-
rikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2003. 
29  See Henrik Thune and Ståle Ulriksen, ‘Prestige and penance through peace. Norway as an 
allied activist’ in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Norman Hilmer (eds), Activism and 
(Non)Alignment: The Relationship Between Foreign Policy and Security Doctrine, Con-
ference Papers 31, Utrikespolitiska institutet, Stockholm and NUPI Working Paper 637, 
2002; Mark Leonard and Andrew Small, Norwegian Public Diplomacy, Oslo: Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, available at  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/public.pdf. For a discussion of Norway’s 
identity and foreign policy (in Norwegian), see Halvard Leira (ed.), Norske selvbilder og 
norsk utenrikspolitikk, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2007. 
30  NATO’s role in Afghanistan, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm 
31  Norway’s Whole-of-Government, pp. 26–28. 
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way’s policy and expand ownership of its Afghanistan engagement 
beyond the MoD and specialized MFA circles.  
 
Importantly however, this is an ad hoc arrangement established for 
dealing with Afghanistan only – not other potential global crises. It 
does not include a permanent secretariat or a formalized organization 
of any kind. Furthermore, there exists no government-level political 
strategy paper for the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan as a 
whole – only partisan statements by government representatives when 
addressing the Parliament or the media.32  
 
All the same, Norway is a significant contributor to Afghanistan in 
relation to its size. The Norwegian military engagement costs about 1 
billion kroner (approx. 120 million Euros) per year,33 while 750 mil-
lion kroner (approx. 93 million Euros) is pledged annually in humani-
tarian and development aid for the next five years. About 15% of 
these funds are allocated to the Faryab region, where the PRT is lo-
cated.34 Thus we should note that the main portion of Norwegian re-
sources spent on Afghanistan (disregarding the military expenses) is 
not dispersed through a Whole-of-Government approach (WGA) sys-
tem in Afghanistan. The following will therefore examine only the 
above-mentioned 15% of the civilian funding, and the relationship be-
tween civilian and military actors operating in the same territory – the 
Faryab district. Moreover, Norwegian NGOs are not the sole imple-
menters of these funds: international NGOs are also significantly in-
volved, but they are rarely mentioned in the Norwegian debates.35 
 
Bearing this in mind, we may say that, in Afghanistan, Norway’s 
WGA is ‘operationalized’ through the PRT in Faryab in ISAF Re-
gional Command North (RC N). The mandate of the PRT is to pro-
mote security and good governance and to facilitate development and 
reconstruction, all in close collaboration with the government of Af-
                                                 
32  Although the government recently launched an internet portal dedicated to the Norwegian 
engagement in Afghanistan:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/kampanjer/bistand_afghanistan.html?id=573474 
33  This estimate depends on how one chooses to calculate the expenses (investments, main-
tenance, running costs etc), and it could arguably be much higher. See also ‘Norge bruker 
én milliard på Afghanistan-krigen’ Dagbladet, 16 March 2010,  
http://www.dagbladet.no/2009/10/14/nyheter/afghanistan/utenriks/forsvarspolitikk/85679
12/ 
34  Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, Address to the Storting on the situation in Afghanistan 
and Norway’s civilian and military engagement in the country, 9 February 2010, accessed 
from http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-
articles/speeches_foreign/2010/afghanistan_address.html , 16 April 2010. Norwegian 
funds are otherwise distributed as follows: 51% for governance, 23% for rural develop-
ment, education 11% and humanitarian aid 15%. See Svar på spørsmål fra Høyre om sivil 
bistand til Afghanistan¸ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, 9 February 2010, 
accessed from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/svar_stortinget/sporretime/2010/svar_sivilbi
stand.html?id=593063, 16 April 2010. 
35  For example, the French/Afghan NGO ACTED is a significant implementer of Norwe-
gian donor funds. http://www.acted.org/en/afghanistan  
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ghanistan and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).36 The 
PRT consists of about 400 soldiers (including 100 from Latvia) and 
some 10 to 20 civilians. The civilian group typically has a civilian co-
ordinator, a political adviser, development advisers, police advisers 
and prison advisers, mainly from Norway, but also from Iceland and 
Latvia. The civilians and the military are co-located and are placed 
under certain common military security regulations, but operate oth-
erwise relatively separately. The civilians are divided into at least two 
groups: the police and prison advisers (MoJ) and the political and de-
velopment advisers (MFA). The role of the political and development 
advisers is to oversee the implementation of development pro-
grammes, liaise with the local authorities, the UN and others, and help 
to develop new projects and programmes. None of the civilians are 
under the command of the military contingent – they coordinate with 
the embassy in Kabul and with relevant ministries and directorates in 
Oslo. In other words, the PRT is not a very integrated unit. 
Critical analysis 
PRT stove-piping 
The Norwegian-led PRT is a classic example of ‘stove-piping’. The 
military chain of command goes through RC North, ISAF HQ and the 
rest of the NATO structure, in addition to the national lines, through 
the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in RC N (Mazar-e-
Sharif), the Norwegian Operational Command in Bodø and the MoD 
in Oslo. The civilians report mainly to the embassy in Kabul, some-
times also directly to Oslo. There is no tactical (Meymaneh/Faryab) or 
operational (Kabul) headquarters or equivalent of the Oslo Afghani-
stan Forum. The civilians and the military coordinate as best they can, 
but it is all based on good will, not on systems or regulations. There is 
no common higher level of command to refer to in case of conflict.37 
Neither is there a common plan. A ‘Faryab strategy’ was developed 
for the first time in 2009, but it represents more of a lowest common 
denominator than a strategy.38 Good ambitions are plentiful, but they 
are not organized in a prioritized way in terms of time or resources. 
This all seems to represent a compromise between various ministries 
and not a political agenda – and as a planning tool it is of limited 
value for the PRT. 
                                                 
36  NATOs role in Afghanistan, see fn 30 above 
37  For more details on the PRT model, see Norway’s Whole-of-Government, pp. 29–33. 
38  See A strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab prov-
ince, Afghanistan, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of 
Justice and the Police, May 2009. Available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Strategy_Norway-in-Faryab-
Afghanistan.pdf, accessed 16 April 2010. 
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Each military contingent appears to deploy with a somewhat different 
set of objectives for its deployment period, seeking to make a differ-
ence or set a mark during its tenure. While the military is integrated 
into the ISAF structure, including the regular RC N planning proc-
esses, the PRTs enjoy substantial leeway in their day-to-day opera-
tions. It is largely up to the Norwegian Armed Forces (and the PRT 
partner nations) to define the operational priorities. The ISAF com-
mand structure is therefore not an impediment to enhanced national 
coherence. Nonetheless, long-term planning – covering several years 
and PRT rotations – has not been conducted within the Armed Forces, 
or in conjunction with the civilian PRT representatives. 
 
The political and development advisers may be considered the ex-
tended arm of the embassy, but they have weak direct links to Oslo. 
The civilian coordinator and political advisors are typically younger 
civil servants, not career diplomats with a good foothold and network 
in the embassy or MFA in Oslo. They are therefore not in a particu-
larly strong position for strongly implementing Norwegian foreign 
policy or influencing the more senior (LtCol) PRT commander. The 
development advisors are also externally recruited personnel without 
much network in the MFA or the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation, NORAD.  
 
As a result of all this, there is no Norwegian common political strat-
egy, no common planning, monitoring or evaluation of the efforts 
made in the various sectors where Norway is engaged in Faryab. The 
military engagement is carried out rather like a ‘stabilization opera-
tion’ based on patrolling either alone or embedded with the ANA units 
they train; the police advisers train the ANP; and both are engaging 
insurgents, criminal gangs or others that oppose the power of the 
ANSF and ISAF.39 The civilians do traditional development pro-
grammes. None of them can refer to an overarching common plan. 
The political effects of all these activities are not being knitted to-
gether into a comprehensive strategy. 
 
It appears odd that otherwise well-organized Norway has such an ap-
parently inefficient and ad hoc system. 
From humanitarian aid to political development 
The relatively influential civil society in Norway has been particularly 
critical of the PRT, especially in its early years. The PRT was accused 
of blurring the lines between the humanitarian and military space, by 
e.g. using white vehicles, engaging in short-sighted (‘Quick Impact’) 
                                                 
39  ANA: Afghan National Army; ANP: Afghan National Police; ANSF: Afghan National 
Security Forces, i.e. all police, border police and military units. 
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civilian projects, and generally entering the turf of the civilian NGOs. 
This, it was argued, resulted not only in unprofessionally implemented 
development projects, but could also jeopardize the NGOs, as the lo-
cal population would consider them as a party to the conflict.40 Here 
we may note the words of the Secretary General of the Norwegian 
Refugee Council, who recently stated that it was ‘easier during Tali-
ban’, arguing that it was easier to build trust with the local population 
and hence implement their programmes before ISAF entered the thea-
tre.41 From her point of view then, ISAF has been part of the problem 
and not the solution, as it has contributed to hamper the humanitarian 
and development work. As a result of such criticism, the need for pro-
tection of the ‘humanitarian space’42 has now been better recognized 
by the government. The plan for the future of the PRT is to further 
separate the civilian and military tasks, including a possible physical 
division of the two. 
 
Hence, attempts to strengthen the coordination have met resistance 
from those NGOs tasked with implementing Norway’s development 
aid objectives. However, the scepticism towards the military – their 
potential undermining of the humanitarian space – appears to have 
spilled over also to the development sector. There is a tendency for the 
NGOs to keep defending their humanitarian space, while being more 
silent about the development programmes they are implementing. It 
may be argued that there have been instances, in Norway and else-
where, of conflating the ‘humanitarian space’ with ‘NGO space’, i.e. 
defining everything NGOs do as untouchable.43 
 
The reason could be that development aid, while qualitatively distinct 
from humanitarian aid, is nonetheless largely regarded as non-
political, in Norway and internationally. The aim of development is 
typically ‘poverty reduction’, which is seen as a universal good, based 
on the Millennium Development Goals. A guiding Norwegian docu-
ment uses the same references, although it also includes more political 
concepts like ‘the principles of the rule of law, political pluralism and 
                                                 
40  Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad, Civil–military Relations: No Room for Humanitarianism 
in comprehensive approaches, Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Li-
brary No. 5, 2008; Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer (eds), Resetting the rules of en-
gagement. Trends and issues in the military–humanitarian relations, London: Humanitar-
ian Policy Group HPG, 2006, p. 49. 
41  See ‘Lettere under Taliban’ ABCNyheter, 28 December 2009, 
http://www.abcnyheter.no/node/102276 
42  The ‘humanitarian space’ refers to purely humanitarian projects, which are considered 
non-political and based on International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and not on e.g. a UN 
Security Council resolution. The guiding principle for humanitarian agencies is often re-
ferred to as the ‘humanitarian imperative’ and often summarized as ‘independence, impar-
tiality and neutrality’. See Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, 1995. 
43  Sylvian Beauchamp, Defining the Humanitarian Space Through Public International 
Law, Canadian Red Cross, 2008, p. 16, available at 
http://www.redcross.ca/cmslib/general/obeoc_beauchamp.pdf. 
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democracy’.44 The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), 
which is the main point of reference for the development agencies in 
Afghanistan, is built on the same principles. It covers all sectors Af-
ghanistan needs to develop to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals and is based on three pillars, ‘security’; ‘governance, rule of 
law and human rights’ and ‘economic and social development’. In 
practice, however, it is used primarily by actors involved in poverty 
reduction, and less by those concerned with security and political sta-
bility.45 Furthermore, it is not connected to a political strategy of how 
to stabilize the country, and largely disconnected from any baseline 
study or conflict/political analysis. 
 
Norwegian objectives, like those of the UN and the wider interna-
tional community, are highly political and sensitive. It is a question of 
taking sides in an internal violent conflict, supporting one set of values 
(liberal) and one set of actors (the authorities).46 The insurgents tend 
to object to several elements of the Millennium Development Goals, 
the ANDS and the Norwegian development aid criteria. Democratiza-
tion, empowering women and rule of law are some of these contested 
elements. If one nonetheless chooses to implement such projects 
(there are strong arguments for doing so), awareness of the political 
connotations is a sine qua non. A risk analysis and a continuous, ‘real-
time’, political effect and impact analysis would be natural parts of 
such an approach. However, the development community has at best a 
limited tradition in this field.47 
From impartial peacekeeping to political security and state-
building 
It is not only the development agencies that struggle with the realities 
in Afghanistan. Just as most development tasks are inherently politi-
cal, so are the military. The tasks of ISAF are not limited to technical 
institution-building (like the ANA), also required is a systematic po-
litical agenda. ISAF is supposed to ‘assist the Afghan Government in 
exercising and extending its authority and influence across the coun-
try, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance.’48 It 
                                                 
44  See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD): Grant schemes for humanitarian assistance and development co-
operation by Norwegian and international voluntary actors. Guidelines, available at 
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=129
252; and ‘Stortingsmelding 35’. 
45  Afghanistan has added ‘enhance security’ as a 9th topic of the Millennium Development 
Goals. See http://www.undp.org.af/MDGs/goal9.htm  
46  Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Derfor er Norge i Afghanistan’ (Why Norway is in 
Afghanistan), Aftenposten, 22 December 2007. Available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/statsminis
ter_jens_stoltenberg/2007-4/derfor-er-norge-i-afghanistan.html?id=491689 
47  See Turid Lægreid, Joint Evaluations and Learning in Complex Emergencies. Lessons 
from the Humanitarian and Development Domain, Security in Practice No. 7, Oslo: Nor-
wegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009. 
48  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm, accessed 17 July 2009. 
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is therefore a security and state-building mission, where strengthening 
the Afghan government takes precedence over poverty reduction. 
COM ISAF, General S.A. McChrystal, has additionally put strong 
emphasis on building local legitimacy: 
 
The Afghan people are the Objective. Protecting them is 
the mission. Focus 95% of your time building relation-
ships with them and, together with the Afghan govern-
ment, meeting their needs.49 
 
To do this, the military must engage much more with the civilian 
population than in the traditional stabilization operations. Building 
relations and boosting the support of the Afghan authorities requires 
more dialogue and interaction with various leaders, groups and stake-
holders, backed by a solid political and cultural understanding of the 
local society. 
 
This is challenging firstly because it clashes with the traditional Nor-
wegian ideas based on ‘humanitarian space’, i.e. that the military 
should avoid too much interaction with the civilian population, as that 
is the ‘turf’ of the civilian actors. It is also a challenge because the 
Norwegian troops have hardly have been trained and equipped for 
such tasks. They have been set up for more conventional ‘stability’ or 
‘robust peacekeeping’ operations that are less focused on building the 
legitimacy of host-nation authorities. 
 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the Norwegian military identity 
has become more offensive and combat-oriented in recent years as a 
result of the experiences from Afghanistan. While this, in many re-
spects, is a healthy and realistic orientation, given the nature of the 
military profession (compared to e.g. the desk officers of the Cold 
War or the previously ‘impotent’ UN peacekeepers), it may also have 
made them overly enemy- and security- focused. If this is the case, 
COM ISAF’s tasking above becomes difficult to implement. It re-
quires less use of force, less offensive operations, but correspondingly 
more exposure, cultural awareness and thorough political analysis. 
Such ‘smart’ operations require a sophisticated political sensitivity 
traditionally rather unfamiliar to Norway’s armed forces.  
 
The Norwegian armed forces and the NGO sector seem to share a tra-
dition of not considering the political implications and effects when 
designing their programmes and operations. Neither pillar of the PRT 
appears to include political analysis systematically in operational 
                                                 
49  COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance (undated) 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf , p. 7; ac-
cessed 17 November 2009. GIRoA = the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghani-
stan. 
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planning – they also lack the tradition and the necessary tools. Such a 
coordinated political approach to Faryab would require a shared set of 
political objectives and priorities, shared situational awareness and a 
shared conflict- and stakeholder analysis.  
 
While there are strong arguments for keeping civilian and military op-
erations separate in many cases, there is no reason why they not 
should plan and evaluate together, to ensure that resources are coher-
ently spent and with maximal political efficiency. With the possible 
exception of purely humanitarian projects, all Norwegian aid to Af-
ghanistan should in principle aim at the same political objectives – as 
defined by the government.50 It would seem that traditional ideas 
about roles and ‘turfs’, combined with the lack of a tradition of sys-
tematic political analysis, prevents such collaboration. 
Conclusions 
To the extent that Norway and the wider international community can 
make a significant positive difference in Afghanistan – and that is a 
separate discussion51 – conflicting mandates, visions, priorities and 
perceptions are certainly not making it any easier to accomplish this 
task. Norway is not alone in being pulled in different directions simul-
taneously. But there is in Norway an apparent additional uneasiness 
about being an explicitly political actor, no longer hiding behind a veil 
of universal values and principles. 
 
As a result, Norway’s WGA model in the PRT is struggling with 
higher hurdles than the organizational and structural ones. It is about 
acknowledging the immensely political role, and about having the po-
litical will to decide on the main priorities in Afghanistan – poverty 
reduction, or security and political state-building. Oslo has tended to 
avoid this debate altogether, continuing to try to do several things at 
the same time. The underlying assumption must be that these ends can 
be achieved independently of each other, or at least that they not are in 
conflict, so that a tighter WGA is not needed. This is a questionable 
assumption that reflects the wider problem facing the international 
community in Afghanistan. As long as key actors have significantly 
different perceptions, objectives and solutions, and are reluctant to ac-
knowledge these differences, the prospects for peace and security, and 
for achieving the Millennium Goals as well as state-building will all 
remain grim. 
                                                 
50  Based on Afghan needs, ANDS etc. 
51  For critical analyses on the prospect of success in Afghanistan, see e.g. Helge Lurås, 
Norge i Afghanistan – bakgrunn, retorikk, fortsettelse, NUPI Notat 768, Oslo: NUPI, 
2009; and Vestens intervensjon i Afghanistan- bakgrunn, praksis, fortsettelse, NUPI Notat 
765, Oslo: NUPI, 2009. 
Conclusion:  
Similar Challenges --But No Nordic 
Whole of Government Model 
Karsten Friis 
 
 
 
A certain Nordic identity and ‘brand’ has been discernible for centu-
ries, even if it has never been a forceful political movement.50 The 
Nordic countries have had rather different security and defence poli-
cies51 – but they arguably still share a common interest in the civilian 
aspects of crisis management,52 in humanitarian questions and in sup-
porting multilateral institutions.53 There is also a growing political will 
towards greater Nordic security cooperation.54  
 
From the brief explorations in this report, we may conclude that there 
is no such thing as a Nordic whole-of-government model. The four 
countries in question have differed in their approaches to national 
strategies, organization and field deployments. These differences 
probably stem from domestic organizational and political cultures, 
formal international affiliations and alliances (EU, NATO), as well as 
commitments to the partners in the on-going operations. There are, 
however, also similarities to be found. 
 
Let us begin by summarizing some of the findings in this report, start-
ing from the top political and strategic level. Only Sweden and 
                                                 
50  See Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds), European Integration and National Identity. The 
Challenge of the Nordic States, London: Routledge, 2002; Christopher S. Browning, 
‘Branding Nordicity. Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism’ Cooperation 
and Conflict¸ Vol. 42, No.1, 2007, pp. 27–51. 
51  Arne Olav Brundtland, ‘The Nordic Balance’ Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
1965, pp. 30–63; Pernille Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity: The EU 
and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States. London: Routledge, 2006. 
52  Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on 
the Civilian ESDP’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009, pp. 81–
102. 
53  Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herlof and Bengt Sundelius (eds), The Nordic Countries and 
the European Security and Defence Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
54  Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy. Proposals 
Presented to the Extraordinary Meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers in Oslo on 9 Febru-
ary 2009. Available at 
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Frettatilkynning/Nordic_report.pdf, accessed 27 
April 2010; see also the subsequent Memorandum of Understanding on Nordic Defence 
Cooperation, signed 5 November 2009, available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Temadokumenter/NORDEFCO_MoU.pdf, ac-
cessed 27 April 2010. 
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Finland have developed national strategies for participation in peace-
support, security-building and/or crisis-management operations. These 
seek to harmonize development, security and diplomacy and lay the 
foundations for concerted action. Norway and Denmark have no simi-
lar documents or strategies for international operations.  
 
Despite this, on the institutional or implementation level of crisis 
management, Denmark is perhaps the country with the most sophisti-
cated model; it includes ministerial coordination, a steering group, a 
secretariat and a reference group. Although this is a rather new struc-
ture which is yet to become fully operational, it is based on the experi-
ences of the Afghanistan task force. Both Sweden and Finland have 
similar models in the pipeline as a result of their national strategies. 
Norway is the ‘odd man out’ here, with no inter-ministerial standing 
crisis management architecture similar to the other three countries.  
 
Concerning Afghanistan in particular, Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
have all developed national policy directives or strategies for their ac-
tivities. These documents seek to encompass the security, governance, 
economic and humanitarian aspects of the engagement, but show 
weaknesses when it comes to coordination with military (Sweden) or 
political aspects (Denmark). In the case of Norway, the political direc-
tion can be found in government documents and statements, but not as 
explicitly elaborated as in its three neighbours. However, Norway and 
others have developed strategies for the districts or regions their ar-
mies are operating in – also these with some weaknesses.  
 
All four countries have some sort of inter-ministerial Afghanistan task 
force. The chief difference lies in the degree of permanence and po-
litical anchoring of this structure. Norway has chosen a non-
institutionalized ad hoc approach, whereas the others seem to be using 
Afghanistan as a stepping stone to more permanent crisis management 
structures. Still, Denmark appears to be the only country which has 
seriously attempted to bridge the civilian–military gap – in Afghani-
stan and beyond. 
 
All four have faced practical challenges related to civilian–military 
cooperation in their PRTs. Finland has stopped sending civilian ex-
perts to the PRTs; Norway is planning to move them out and further 
strengthen the operational divide between them and the military. Swe-
den also separates civilian and military efforts in the strategy and in its 
PRT, leaving the latter more as part of ISAF than of the Swedish strat-
egy. Denmark is the sole Nordic country to conduct joint civilian–
military operational planning (in conjunction with the UK). However, 
Denmark and others have been experiencing challenges in recruiting 
senior civilian (MFA) representatives at the tactical levels. 
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We may conclude that the main common Nordic feature is this: while 
efforts are being made to streamline various ministries at the policy 
level, little is done on the practical level – in the field in Afghanistan. 
As a result, the coherence developed in the national capitals appears to 
get lost in the implementation phase. The effectiveness of the efforts 
and the impact on the overall peace or stability thus seem limited. But 
is this necessarily the case? 
 
The underlying rationale of this reasoning is that if all countries were 
some day to achieve national coherence among all the deployed state 
actors, theatre-level coherence would be enhanced as well. Robert 
Egnell argues along such lines in his Complex Peace Operations and 
Civil–Military Relations, where he claims that an integrated national 
civil–military structure would boost the effectiveness of operations.55 
He bases his argument on a comparative study of the USA and UK, 
and concludes that ‘integrated civil–military approaches are necessary 
for effectiveness in achieving the often far-reaching political aims of 
democratization and economic development.56 Egnell substantiates 
this claim mainly through organizational and institutional arguments – 
that integrated structures would build bridges between ministries and 
cultures, and provide strategic guidance to all relevant actors through 
a chain of command. While these are sound theoretical arguments in 
terms of organizational effectiveness, the brief explorations in this re-
port indicate that there are several obstacles in real life which Egnell 
fails to take into account. One of them is competing, or even conflict-
ing, mandates. The contribution on Sweden illustrates this in pointing 
to the tension between the Swedish national objective in Afghanistan 
(focused primarily on poverty reduction) and ISAF’s more security-
focused objectives, within which the Swedish armed forces are operat-
ing. As a result, the Swedish military and the civilian agencies have 
different mandates and priorities. The Danish example shows some-
thing similar: Danish national coordination had to await the conclu-
sion of UK coordination. If the Swedish military were to be fully inte-
grated into the national Swedish strategy, it would likely be at odds 
with the ISAF strategy. Similarly, if Denmark had pressed ahead with 
its own national strategy irrespective of the priorities of its major part-
ner in the field, the plan would probably not contributed to overall ef-
fectiveness and coherence. 
 
Hence, effectiveness in terms of improved results must be measured in 
inter-agency coherence in the field. It is the coherence among and be-
tween the key actors – the UN (UNAMA, UNDP, etc.), WB, OCHA, 
USA etc., – that determines effectiveness, not national coherence. 
                                                 
55  Robert Egnell, Complex Peace Operations and Civil–Military Relations, London: 
Routledge, 2009. 
56  Ibid., p. 173. 
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Fully streamlined national contributions will not be positive for over-
all coherence if they are not in tune with the large actors. Furthermore, 
small states will generally be only contributors to the larger actors in 
international crisis management operations, rarely playing a dominant 
or defining role. Their impact will depend upon the relevance of the 
contributions, ‘plug-in’ capabilities and general agility to adapt to 
changing needs. Coherence of small states may actually undermine a 
theatre-level comprehensive approach – it may lead to inflexibility, 
complicated command structures (everything must go via the home 
capital), and de facto caveats that limit operational agility. Coherence 
at home may therefore be of less relevance in the field than Egnell’s 
theory assumes. 
 
The situation is somewhat different for larger states, like the USA, 
Canada and the UK. These are to a greater extent capable of defining 
the priorities and agendas of the international community in crisis 
management. Furthermore, their PRTs actually have substantial civil-
ian components and resources which would benefit from a more coor-
dinated approach. USAID, for example, explicitly states that it is part 
of US counter-insurgency efforts.57 The Nordic states, however, dis-
burse only a minor fraction of their efforts through their PRTs,58 so 
there is less of a ‘national area of operation’. Their civilian efforts are 
largely channelled through other actors, like the WB, trust funds for 
the Afghan government, or to NGOs operating all over the country. 
As a result, the arena in which to implement a national whole of gov-
ernment policy is limited. 
 
The Nordic reluctance to apply significant civilian assets in conjunc-
tion with the military clearly weakens the impact of the PRTs and thus 
also the military contributions. Significant political diplomatic and 
economic engagement is a precondition for lasting security, but the 
limited tactical-level coherence leaves the military operations in a 
bubble where the political implications of the activities are not suffi-
ciently accounted for. Denmark may be a partial  exception here, but 
also its PRT struggles in this regard. Ensuring that military contribu-
tions are integrated and coherent with civilian efforts is a logically a 
responsibility for the troop-providing nation, but this way of thinking 
appears to be unfamiliar ground for the Nordic countries, where mili-
tary and political/development tasks have traditionally remained sepa-
rated.  
                                                 
57  USAID/Afghanistan Strategy, 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.CountryOverview.aspx, accessed 19 May 2010. 
58  However, the UK spends only 20% of its civilian aid budget in Helmand. See Finn Step-
putat 2009, Synthesis report. Civil–Military Relations in International Operations. DIIS 
Report 2009, p. 50. 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009_16_Synthesis_
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We may therefore conclude that what matters is not primarily national 
coordination but field coordination. However, whole-of-government 
solutions among the ministries in the Nordic capitals are still impor-
tant, as it is necessary to make sure the various national contributions 
to the wider efforts are coordinated. All the Nordic states have made 
efforts in this regard. Nonetheless, for security to take hold, civilian 
efforts need to focus on political developments, not only poverty re-
duction. That requires coherence between civilian and military actors. 
Denmark appears to be taking lead among the Nordics in recognizing 
this feature of today’s conflicts; the others are still largely reluctant. 
Such hesitance can prove costly – it is time for the Nordic countries to 
acknowledge the deeply political nature of stabilization and crisis 
management operations. 
 
 
